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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Norris, Tyrell 
NY SID: 
DIN: 02-R-4885 
Facility: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Appearances: Tyrell Norris, 02-R-4885 
Mid-State Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 2500 
Marcy, NY 13403 
Mid-State CF 
05-017-19 B 
Decision appealed: April 2019 decision, denying discretionary rele~se and imposing a hold of 18 months. 
Board Merriber(s) Agostini, Cruse 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-briefreceived July 11, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the ·separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Imnate's Counsel, if any, on I I/'). bD 9 . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Norris, Tyrell DIN: 02-R-4885  
Facility: Mid-State CF AC No.:  05-017-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 3) 
 
Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
an 18-month hold. The instant offenses involve possession of 25 ziplock bags of cocaine and 
running a narcotics trafficking enterprise in a housing development, bringing in large quantities of 
cocaine and heroin for processing, packaging, storing, preparing, and selling at street level. 
Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to consider that he received a lack of 
assistance from his offender rehabilitation coordinator; 2)  
 3) the Board relied on erroneous information in the COMPAS 
instrument; and 4) the decision violated due process. These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense involving Appellant’s role as a leader in a large 
scale drug-trafficking enterprise; Appellant’s criminal history including prior convictions for 
selling drugs; his institutional efforts including improved disciplinary record, receipt of his GED, 
work as a mobile assistant,  and ART; and release plans to seek assistance 
from a reentry program and work in construction.  The Board also had before it and considered, 
among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, official 
statements from the Court and the District Attorney, and an email from Appellant’s fiancée. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense and Appellant’s criminal history 
including prior convictions for selling drugs. See Matter of Boccadisi v. Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 
20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 
(3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 
1990).  In its decision, the Board noted Appellant’s elevated COMPAS scores for negative social 
cognitions and low self-efficacy and optimism. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 
172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 
1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board encouraged Appellant to maintain his 
improved disciplinary record and develop a more defined reentry plan. See Matter of Delrosario v. 
Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
To the extent Appellant contends he received a lack of assistance from his offender 
rehabilitation coordinator (“ORC”) and that this should have been considered by the Board, his 
contention is without merit. That Appellant’s written request to his ORC asking that she help proof 
and rewrite his personal statement was denied does not provide a basis to disturb the Board’s 
decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
Insofar as Appellant claims the Board relied on erroneous information in the COMPAS 
instrument, Appellant’s objection is vague and seems to stem from the fact that his current 
COMPAS instrument differs from the one prepared prior to his last interview. A review of the 
record reveals most of Appellant’s COMPAS scores, including those for negative social cognitions 
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and low self-efficacy and optimism, improved on the latest COMPAS instrument. Appellant does 
not claim, nor is there any indication, that he sought to make changes to any scores prior to the 
interview. Appellant failed to raise the alleged deficiency during the interview and in fact attributed 
the scores in question to his personal outlook and attitude (Tr. at 7). As to the COMPAS 
procedures, Directive 8500 sets forth the operating procedures for the application of COMPAS 
Risk and Need Assessment.  The Board does not prepare the COMPAS instrument, but merely 
considers the COMPAS and scores given to each risk or need. An administrative appeal to the 
Board is not the proper forum to challenge the COMPAS instrument.   
 
Finally, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 
1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and 
thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of 
Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 
797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
